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“THE GOOD MOTHER”1: MOTHERING,
FEMINISM, AND INCARCERATION
DESERIEE A. KENNEDY*
ABSTRACT
As the rates of incarceration continue to rise, women are increas-
ingly subject to draconian criminal justice and child welfare policies
that frequently result in the loss of their parental rights.2 The inter-
section of an increasingly carceral state and federally imposed time-
lines for achieving permanency for children in state care has had a
negative effect on women, their children, and their communities.
Women, and their ability to parent, are more adversely affected by the
intersection of these gender-neutral provisions because they are
more likely than men to be the primary caretaker of their children.3 In
addition, incarcerated women have higher rates of substance abuse, do-
mestic violence, and childhood and domestic abuse that make it more
difficult for them to comply with federal and state standards for re-
taining their parental rights.4 Incarcerated mothers must also strug-
gle against stereotypes of mothers and effective mothering which may
be at play in parental termination decisions. This article suggests that
feminists need to look more closely at these issues and proposes
changes to arrest, sentencing, and parental rights hearings that would
help incarcerated women maintain their connection with their children
and preserve their parental rights. The article suggests a community-
based approach to caring for the children of incarcerated women that
would help empower women and their communities.
INTRODUCTION
I. WOMEN, CRIME, & THE CRISIS IN FAMILIES
II. BARRIERS TO PRESERVING FAMILY UNITY IN FAMILIES WITH AN
INCARCERATED MOTHER
1. SUE MILLER, THE GOOD MOTHER (1986).
* Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. The author
would like to thank Touro Law Center for its support and her research assistants,
Paulina Rezler and Jesseka Green, for their outstanding assistance.
2. See, e.g., State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 323 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2008) (noting the loss of parental rights for the petitioner).
3. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
4 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf.
4. Id. at 7.
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III. DEVELOPING A CRITICAL RACE FEMINIST APPROACH TO RESOLV-
ING THE TENSION BETWEEN PRESERVING PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
ENSURING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 2007, when Omarian was four years old, the Com-
missioner of Children and Families filed a petition seeking the termi-
nation of the parental rights of Omarian’s mother, Caliphah.5 Caliphah
was thirty-four years old and had a record with the Department of
Children and Services that included shoplifting with her children and
domestic violence.6 When Omarian was about two years old, Caliphah
was sentenced to four years in federal prison for forgery, criminal
impersonation, larceny and illegal entry into the United States.7
Caliphah placed Omarian with his aunt, but after concerns about the
quality of his care, the State removed Omarian and placed him with
foster parents.8 Caliphah maintained her desire that Omarian be
raised by her relatives until she could regain custody of him upon her
release, but the court determined that she failed to maintain suffi-
cient ties to her son.9 Despite testimony from Caliphah asking that
her ties not be severed and stating that his Aunt was willing to care
for the child, the court found that Caliphah’s parental rights should
be terminated.10 The Court was persuaded by four-year-old Omarian’s
unwillingness to visit his mother in prison or the siblings he barely
knew and found that Caliphah had “abandoned” Omarian by failing
to maintain consistent contact with him while in federal prison.11
The court stated that Caliphah
has not provided financial support to the child and has not main-
tained consistent visitation and contact with [Omarian]. . . .
There was no evidence that the mother sent cards, gifts or letters
5. In re Omarian R., No. H14CP06008614A, 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1427, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2008). The Connecticut statute at issue in the case allows
the termination of parental rights based on a finding of abandonment. According to the
court, a court may find abandonment if a parent “failed to maintain a reasonable degree
of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.” Id. at *21 (citing CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) (2011)). “Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility in-
clude ‘[a]ttempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and
gifts, and financial support . . . .’ ” Id. at *21–22.
6. Id. at *8.
7. Id. at *9.
8. Id. at *9–10.
9. Id. at *14, 25.
10. Id.
11. In re Omarian R., 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1427, at *10–11, *19, *22–23.
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to the child or participated in the child’s education or shown [sic]
an interest in his health or welfare. The mother has not provided
a domicile for the child, did not provide food, medical shelter or
clothing for the child, nor offered a specific plan to provide those
basic necessities for her son.12
Caliphah, who was scheduled to be released from prison one year
later, faced the loss of her child and deportation.13 Caliphah’s story
is strikingly similar to the vastly increasing numbers of women and
mothers in prison who frequently are faced with challenges to their
parental rights while in prison.14
Women, and in particular poor women and women of color, are
uniquely and disproportionately affected by the intersection of crim-
inal policies that rely heavily on incarceration and child welfare
policies designed to achieve permanence for children in state care.15
The number of women who are under criminal supervision has grown
dramatically over the last twenty years.16 These women are often more
likely to have been the primary caretakers of their children prior to
incarceration than incarcerated fathers.17 Unlike male prisoners with
children, who can often rely on the child’s mother to continue to care
12. Id. at *23.
13. Id. at *16–17.
14. See, e.g., State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 323 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2008) (affirming termination of parental rights of incarcerated mother and remand-
ing for collection of costs assessed against the mother).
15. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT: WOMEN IN PRISON 6 (1994), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf
/WOPRIS.PDF (finding an incarcerated woman of color more likely to be a mother with a
minor child than white women).
16. NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED 33
(2005) (finding women to be the fastest-growing prison population); GLAZE & MARUSCHAK,
supra note 3, at 3 (“[P]arents in prison had nearly 1.9 million children . . . .”);
CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT: INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 1 (2000), available at http://bjs
.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf (finding an increase of 500,000 from 1991 to 1999);
Katherine P. Luke, Mitigating the Ill Effects of Maternal Incarceration on Women in
Prison and Their Children, 81 CHILD WELFARE 929, 931–32 (2002) (“[I]ncarceration rates
of women have risen by more than 400% in the past 20 years.”); Jeremy Travis, Families
and Children, 69 FED. PROBATION 31, 33 (2005) (“Between 1991 and 2000, the number of
incarcerated mothers increased by 87 percent, compared with a 60 percent increase in the
number of incarcerated fathers.”); Erica D. Benites, Comment, In Defense of the Family: An
Argument for Maintaining the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Women in Texas, 3 SCHOLAR
193, 194 (2001) (analyzing Texas parental terminations based on parental incarceration).
One study found that three-quarters of all women in prison were mothers, most of whom
had experienced physical or sexual abuse before imprisonment, committed a drug offense,
were in prison for a non-violent offense, and/or committed their crime under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol. SNELL, supra note 15, at 1, 5.
17. Mothers in prison are far more likely than men in prison to report having lived
with their children before incarceration. In addition, mothers were more often a single
parent. See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 4, 5.
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for the child and foster communication between the father and the
child during incarceration, incarcerated mothers more often must
rely on extended family or the state to care for their children while
incarcerated.18 In addition, these women and their families are fre-
quently dealing with socioeconomic stresses, addiction, and histories
of abuse, at higher rates than male prisoners.19 Frequently there are
insufficient resources to address these problems and to assist these
women in keeping their families together.20 The dearth of resources
at a familial or community level and the need to depend on state as-
sistance to provide childcare for their children prior to, during, and
after their incarceration make incarcerated women extremely vul-
nerable to having their parental rights permanently severed during
their incarceration.21
18. Benites, supra note 16, at 218–19.
19. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 7 (“Mothers in state prison [are] more
likely than fathers to report homelessness, past physical or sexual abuse, and medical
and mental health problems.”).
20. See, e.g., In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 520 (Ill. 2005) (finding an incarcerated
mother unfit because of drug, alcohol use, and incarceration); Ellen M. Weber, Bridging
the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding Drug Treatment in Communities, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 644–48 (2005) (describing inadequacy of state and local resources
for drug addicts).
21. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471,
94 Stat. 500 (1980). In addition, some estimate that 34 states have statutes that include
parental incarceration as a factor in terminating parental rights. See BERNSTEIN, supra note
16, at 150. The following statutes allow courts to consider incarceration or conviction as a
factor to be considered in parental termination proceedings: ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(4)
(LexisNexis 2010); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.011(2), 47.10.088 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-
533(B)(4) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(b)(viii) (2011); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7825 (Deering 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(III) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(3) (2011); D.C. CODE §§ 16-2353, 16-2354(b)(3)(C) (LexisNexis 2010);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iii)
(2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005(1)(e) (2010); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-2
(Lexis Nexis 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(r) (LexisNexis 2011); IND. CODE
§ 31-34-21-5.6(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-2269(b)(5), 38-2271 (2010);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(6)
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4055 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.1(b)(1)(iii)
(LexisNexis 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 26(c) (LexisNexis 2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 210, § 3(c)(xiii) (LexisNexis 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b(3)(h) (2010); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(g) (2010) (as interpreted in Vance v. Lincoln Cnty. Dep’t. of Pub.
Welfare, 582 So. 2d 414, 418 (Miss. 1991) (“Imprisonment, and the resulting conditions,
can be rightfully considered as a significant factor when determining whether rights may
be terminated.”)); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447 (7)(6) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-423,
41-3-609(1)(c) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292(10)-(11) (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 128.105, 128.106(6), 432B.393 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-
11.2(a)(2), 30:4C-15 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(8) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 27-20-02(3)(f), 27-20-44 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(E) (13) (LexisNexis
2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(12) (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.504(6) (2010);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(9) (2010); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 634a(8), 634b (2010);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-26.1(4), 26-8A-27
(2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(1)(A) (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(Q),
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Mothers with limited family resources for childcare and assistance
are most at risk for having their children enter state care either prior
to or during their incarceration.22 Once a child is in foster care, federal
laws which limit the period of time a child may be in foster care propel
a state to move to terminate the parental rights of an incarcerated
parent under a federally mandated time-line.23 In this way, federal
and state law and policy intersect to place families of incarcerated
mothers and their communities in crisis by making the families vul-
nerable to parental termination.24 The issue of how to balance the need
of the children for stable caring communities and the parental rights
of incarcerated women remains unresolved. In fact, terminations of
parental rights of women who have come into contact with the crimi-
nal justice system have increased dramatically since 1991.25 Yet, this
rise in terminations has not resulted in a comprehensive and system-
atic governmental response to assist these families.26 Nor has there
been a corresponding increase in adoptions for these children.27 The
161.002(b), 161.007 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-6-507, 78A-6-508(2)(e) (Lexis-
Nexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504(a)(3) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(E)
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.34.132(4), 13.34.180 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 49-6-5b(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(4) (2010); see also
Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental
Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678 (2003) (noting an increase in parental
rights termination proceedings for prisoners).
22. JEFFREY H. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY,
CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 78 (2d ed. 1984) (“For the same criminal behavior, the poor
are more likely to be arrested; if arrested, they are more likely to be charged; if charged,
more likely to be convicted; if convicted, more likely to be sentenced to prison; and if
sentenced, more likely to be given longer prison terms than members of the middle and
upper classes.” (citation omitted)); Luke, supra note 16, at 931; Julie Poehlmann, Children
of Incarcerated Mothers and Fathers, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 331, 333 (2009).
23. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)); see also Mariely Downey, Losing
More than Time: Incarcerated Mothers and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 44 (2000–2001); Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time:
Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination
Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 177 n.2 (2004).
24. A few states have responded to the growing crisis by extending the period of time
in which a child may be in state care before triggering the ASFA deadlines. New York
recently amended its parental termination statutes to provide incarcerated parents with
additional time to meet child welfare standards. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
While it is too soon to assess the impact of this legislation, without more, it likely fails to
go far enough to address the underlying substantive issues these families are facing.
25. PATRICIA E. ALLARD & LYNN D. LU, REBUILDING FAMILIES, RECLAIMING LIVES 3
(2006), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/8704.pdf (finding
termination of parental rights of incarcerated parents increased).
26. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a
New Family Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 81 (2011).
27. Marilyn C. Moses, Correlating Incarcerated Mothers, Foster Care, and Mother-
Child Reunification, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2006, at 98, 98 (“Perhaps most notable
is that children of incarcerated mothers were four times more likely to be ‘still in’ foster
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children of incarcerated parents are more likely than other foster
care children not to be adopted and to linger in foster care.28 Whether
criminal justice and child welfare policies that lead to these results
are adequately serving the needs of these families and communities
is a question with which feminists should be deeply concerned. The
dismantling of these families and communities through the operation
of a series of laws and policies should be seen as a call to action for
feminists interested in dismantling stereotypes about women, moth-
ering, race, and poverty. 
The current approach to parental terminations and incarcerated
mothers stems in part from an idealization of motherhood at play in
the application of state parental termination standards and federally
imposed timelines for families with a child in state care.29 The current
approach to parental terminations is based on a traditional notion of
mothering that idealizes a nuclear family model and that lays primary
responsibility for the family’s functioning with the mother.30 At the
same time, it demonizes mothers who, unable to provide direct care on
their own for a multitude of reasons, need to craft a web of support to
assist them to care for their children.31 Current approaches to arrest,
incarceration, parental rights, and child welfare, are critical of moth-
ers who fall short of a mothering ideal and who need help to fulfill
their roles as mothers.32 A critical race feminist approach to the ter-
mination of parental rights for incarcerated mothers would make
visible the numerous social, legal, and political barriers that coalesce
to place an unfair burden on incarcerated mothers. Illuminating the
web of stereotypes, institutional disconnects, and economic and com-
munity realities reveals that terminating parental rights of incarcer-
ated mothers does not resolve the crises in families and communities
hardest hit by the continuing focus on incarceration as a response to
non-violent crimes.33 In addition, severing legal ties between parent
and child is simply one more aspect of the current retribution model
care than all other children. These children linger in foster care until they are 18 when they
‘age out’ of the system.”); Diane H. Schetky et al., Parents Who Fail: A Study of 51 Cases
of Termination of Parental Rights, 18 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 366, 367 (1979)
(“[S]tudies have shown that once a child is placed in foster care, he or she has a 50%
chance of remaining there 3 years or longer. Some studies even suggest that a child who
has been in foster care for longer than 18 months has a remote chance of being either
adopted or returned home.”(internal citations omitted)).
28. Moses, supra note 27, at 98; Schetky et al., supra note 27, at 367.
29. Ross, supra note 23, at 187–88.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., In re Omarian R., No. H14CP06008614A, 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS
1427, at *34–36 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2008) (terminating the parental rights of a
mother who could not secure support for her son during her incarceration).
32. Kennedy, supra note 26, at 80.
33. Id.
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of incarceration that disproportionately affects women and people of
color and removes children not only from their families but from
their communities.34 
This article argues for an examination of the intersection of crim-
inal justice and child welfare policies from a feminist perspective in
order to help support incarcerated mothers and all women who
struggle to expand the notion of motherhood to be more inclusive. It
suggests that a parental rights approach to parental terminations
would operate to empower incarcerated women and their communities
by emphasizing the need to provide adequate long term care for their
children within their own communities without severing the parent-
child relationship. Part I of the article explores the impact of criminal
justice policies on families, Part II examines the barriers to preserving
families created by federal and state laws and policies and Part III
suggests a critical race feminist approach to resolving the tension be-
tween preserving parental rights and ensuring the best interests of the
child that focuses on the need for community-centered solutions to
the current rise in parental terminations.
I. WOMEN, CRIME, & THE CRISIS IN FAMILIES
The involuntary termination of parental rights of prisoners should
be viewed as a gendered and political act with community-wide rami-
fications.35 In assessing the appropriateness of state intervention into
families with incarcerated parents, it is important to be realistic
about the political and economic circumstances of women who commit
crimes and the difficulties they may face raising their families both
prior to and during their incarceration.36 In order to effectively serve
the needs of poor families, child welfare law and policies should ac-
knowledge the impact on women and their families of the war on crime,
mandatory sentencing, and an over-reliance on incarceration as a re-
sponse to drug crimes and substance abuse.37 The heavy reliance on
34. Id. at 113.
35. LEITH MULLINGS, ON OUR OWN TERMS: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE LIVES
OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 93 (1997) (noting that residents of Central Harlem ex-
pressed concern about losing the community’s children).
36. Kathi J. Kemper & Frederick P. Rivara, Parents in Jail, 92 PEDIATRICS 261, 262
(1993) (examining the demographics of incarcerated parents).
37. Joyce A. Arditti, Locked Doors and Glass Walls: Family Visiting at a Local Jail,
8 J. OF LOSS & TRAUMA 115, 115 (2003) (emphasizing the challenges of harsh criminal
sanctions for nonviolent offenders); Holly Foster & John Hagan, The Mass Incarceration
of Parents in America: Issues of Race/Ethnicity, Collateral Damage to Children, and
Prisoner Reentry, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 179, 190 (2009) (noting the im-
pact of a “high reliance on mass incarceration in response to crime in the United States.”);
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incarceration as a response to crime has had a deleterious effect on
women and children.38 These changes in criminal law and policy and
the dependence upon prison as a response to non-violent crimes has
helped the numbers of incarcerated mothers in the United States to
grow eighty-eight percent from 1991 to 2002 and, as a result, the
United States now has “the highest incarceration rate in the world.”39
Although it is still true that most prisoners are male, the number of
women in prison has been skyrocketing.40 In large part due to the
explosion of the female prisoner population, there has been a dra-
matic increase in the numbers of mothers who are incarcerated.41
From 1990 to 2007, the number of mothers in federal and state
Kemper & Rivara, supra note 36, at 262, tbl. 3 (indicating the primary types of offenses
leading to incarceration of mothers); Nekima Levy-Pounds, Can These Bones Live? A Look
At the Impacts of the War on Drugs on Poor African-American Children and Families, 7
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 353, 357 (2010) (“The combination of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Acts of 1984 and 1986 and the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme comprises
the backbone of Congress’s war on drugs. . . . Mandatory minimums caused judges to
sentence defendants to an automatic, pre-determined term of imprisonment based upon
the type and level of offense committed.” (citation omitted)); Chieko M. Clarke, Comment,
Maternal Justice Restored: Redressing the Ramifications of Mandatory Sentencing
Minimums on Women and Their Children, 50 HOW. L.J. 263, 264 (2006) (describing the
“harshness and ineffectiveness of drug sentencing guidelines and conspiracy laws
applied to mothers.”). But see MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 6 tbl. 7 (finding that 24% of
incarcerated parents are serving sentences for drug offenses, compared with 17% of non-
parents, and approximately 44% of parents in prison were violent offenders); Weber,
supra note 20, at 644–48 (stating that communities often resist the establishment of drug
and alcohol treatment programs).
38. Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy
Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1693–94 (2006) (“Over the past three decades, the United
States has built a carceral state that is unprecedented among Western countries and in
U.S. history.”).
39. Arditti, supra note 37, at 115; Christopher J. Mumola, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Parents
Under Correctional Supervision: Past Estimates, New Measures, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE (Nov. 6, 2006), http://archives.drugabuse.gov/meetings/children_at_risk /pdf
/Mumola.pdf.
40. Philip M. Genty, Permanency Planning in the Context of Parental Incarceration:
Legal Issues and Recommendations, 77 CHILD WELFARE POL’Y 543, 544 (1998) (“Over the
past 15 years, the population of female prisoners has increased by almost 400%, while the
male population has increased by more than 200%.”); Luke, supra note 16, at 931–932
(affirming the 400% increase in female incarceration rates over the past 20 years); Zina
T. McGee et al., From the Inside: Patterns of Coping and Adjustment Among Women in
Prison, in IT’S A CRIME: WOMEN & JUSTICE 507, 508 (Roslyn Muraskin ed., 4th ed. 2007)
(asserting that one in every 109 women are under some form of correctional supervision);
Benites, supra note 16, at 194 (describing the increase in female state prisons from 1986
to 1991); see also MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 3 tbl. 3 (examining the characteristics of
prison populations).
41. Adela Beckerman, Mothers in Prison: Meeting the Prerequisite Conditions for
Permanency Planning, 39 SOC. WORK 9, 10 (1994); Kathleen J. Block & Margaret J.
Potthast, Girl Scouts Beyond Bars: Facilitating Parent-Child Contact in Correctional
Settings, 77 CHILD WELFARE 561, 562 (1998); Gottschalk, supra note 38, at 1694, 1723.
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prison increased 122 percent42 while the increase for fathers during
the same period was seventy-six percent.43
Current parental termination statutes that apply gender neutral
standards of fitness and connect incarceration with fitness ignore
the reality that women often have gendered and class-based causes
for their imprisonment.44 The types of crimes that women commit,
according to criminal justice experts, may be intricately related to
women’s overall economic and political position in society.45 Incarcer-
ated women are more likely to be women of color, young, poor, less
educated and largely unskilled.46 Mothers in prison are often deal-
ing with addiction and report higher rates of substance abuse than
incarcerated men.47 Incarcerated women are also more likely than
imprisoned fathers to be struggling with mental health issues.48 Wom-
en in prison report significantly higher incidences of child abuse and
domestic violence as compared to men.49 Typically, the available
services are insufficient to meet the needs of these populations.50
Women in prison and their families are more adversely affected by the
lack of services for alcohol and substance abuse, mental illness, and
childhood and domestic abuse.
Imprisoned mothers are less likely to present a danger to their
children or society.51 Studies suggest that while some inmate parents
42. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 2.
43. Id.
44. Eumi K. Lee, An Overview of Special Populations in California Prisons, 7 HAST.
RACE & POV. L.J. 223, 239 (2010).
45. MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 6 tbl. 7; Ann B. Loper, How Do Mothers in Prison
Differ from Non-Mothers, 15 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 83, 92 (2006) (asserting the possibility
that incarcerated mothers’ “drug activity was motivated by a need to find funds to support
the children”); Luke, supra note 16, at 931 (“Many experts in criminal justice assert that
the crime committed by women is directly related to their disadvantaged economic po-
sition in society . . . .”); Travis, supra note 16, at 32.
46.  Phyllis Jo Baunach, You Can’t Be a Mother and Be in Prison . . . Can You?
Impacts of the Mother-Child Separation, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN
155, 156 (Barbara Raffel Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 1982); Roslyn Muraskin,
Feminist Theories: Are They Needed?, in IT’S A CRIME: WOMEN & JUSTICE, supra note 40,
at 31, 39.
47. JESSICA MEYERSON ET AL., CHILDHOOD DISRUPTED: UNDERSTANDING THE FEATURES
AND EFFECTS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION 7 (2010), available at http://www.voa.org
/Childhood-Disrupted-Report (2010) (finding that 91% of incarcerated mothers who par-
ticipated in the study reported a history of substance abuse). Childhood Disrupted is a qual-
itative study of families affected by maternal incarceration conducted by Volunteers of
America, a nonprofit, faith based organization, and Wilder Research. Id.
48. Id. at 1.
49. McGee et al., supra note 40, at 515 (“[A] large number of [respondents] reported
having been physically or sexually abused before their incarceration (70%) . . . .”).
50. Weber, supra note 20, at 644–48.
51. Kemper & Rivara, supra note 36, at 262 tbl. 3 (noting types of crimes typically
committed by incarcerated mothers).
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commit violent crimes, the majority, like Caliphah, were incarcer-
ated for non-violent offenses.52 Professor Katherine P. Luke maintains
that, “[w]omen are more often convicted of low-level drug offenses
than men.” 53 Comparatively few incarcerated women are in prison
for crimes involving violence, sexual misconduct, or family-related
abuse.54 Mothers in prison are less likely to have committed a vio-
lent crime than other prisoners and more likely to have committed
drug and property crimes than non-mothers.55 Based on the higher
rates of poverty, their status as single parents, and the high per-
centage of inmate women who are domestic abuse survivors, it is
very likely that their crimes may be related to the stress of raising
children, providing for their families, and merely surviving.56 The ma-
jority of these women—some estimate seventy percent—are mothers
of two or three children, most of whom are under the age of thir-
teen.57 These women are also single parents and typically were the
primary caretakers for their children prior to being arrested.58
52. In re Omarian R., No. H14CP06008614A, 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1427 at *9
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2008) (discussing Caliphah’s arrests for larceny, welfare fraud,
and re-entering the United States after deportation); Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder,
Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children,
11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133, 135 (1999); Kemper & Rivara, supra note 36, at 262 tbl.
3 (providing the statistics for types of crimes committed by incarcerated mothers); Luke,
supra note 16, at 931 (“Most incarcerated mothers are in prison for crimes unrelated to
their parenting.” (citation omitted)).
53. Luke, supra note 16, at 931 (“Many in the criminal justice field have suggested
that the aggressive war on drugs and the subsequent mandatory minimum drug sen-
tencing laws are the primary reasons that the rate of female incarceration is increasing
at a rate twice that of male incarceration.”); see also MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 5; SNELL,
supra note 15, at 3 tbl. 2.
54. Kemper & Rivara, supra note 36, at 262 tbl. 3. It is also suggested that there is a
probable link between recidivist parents and increased potential for family violence. Id.
at 263.
55. Travis, supra note 16, at 33 (“Nearly half (46 percent) of incarcerated fathers
were imprisoned for a violent crime, as were one-quarter (26 percent) of the mothers. . . .
Nearly one-third of the mothers reported committing their crime to get either drugs or
money for drugs . . . .”).
56. Loper, supra note 45, at 92; Luke, supra note 16, at 931; Muraskin, supra note 46,
at 39 (examining various feminist theories about women and crime).
57. Baunach, supra note 46, at 156; Garry L. Landreth & Alan F. Lobaugh, Filial
Therapy with Incarcerated Fathers: Effects on Parental Acceptance of Child, Parental
Stress, and Child Adjustment, 76 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 157, 157 (1998). The articulated
estimates of the percentage of incarcerated women with children varies. See Luke, supra
note 16, at 932 (placing the number of incarcerated mothers at 75–80% of incarcerated
women); Lynn Sametz, Children of Incarcerated Women, 25 SOC. WORK 298, 298 (1980)
(reporting the number of incarcerated women as anywhere from 42% to 80%).
58.  Baunach, supra note 46, at 156; Luke, supra note 16, at 930 (“Women who become
incarcerated are usually poorly educated single mothers from communities of color who
are living in poverty and struggling to be the sole financial and emotional providers for
their children.”); Travis, supra note 16, at 32–33.
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For many women, a prison sentence creates a serious childcare
gap.59 The separation due to incarceration results more often in the
need for non-parental care for the child since mothers tend to be the
child’s primary caretaker.60 While most of the mothers will be able
to arrange childcare by a relative or friend, a significant minority of
children end up in state care either as a result of parental behaviors
that preceded incarceration or as a result of the incarceration.61
Children and families affected by maternal incarceration receive
little consistent formal assistance in providing care for the children,
facilitating a relationship between mother and child, or preparing
mothers for their release and successful reintegration into their
communities.62 As a result of these and other factors, women are
uniquely at risk of having their ties to their children permanently
severed, and women of color and poor women are in the greatest
danger.63 Incarcerated mothers are not necessarily unfit, uncaring,
neglectful or abusive.64 Yet the predominant approach to dealing with
incarcerated mothers and their families is to treat these women as
if their convictions are proof of their unsuitability as parents and
evidence of the right of the state to intervene in their families.65
The impact of criminal justice and child welfare policies on
women is just another way in which women are adversely affected
59. See Baunach, supra note 46, at 156.
60. Luke, supra note 16, at 934; Travis, supra note 16, at 33 (“Close to two-thirds
(64 percent) of mothers reported living with their children before incarceration, compared
with slightly less than half (44 percent) of fathers in 1997.”).
61. ZELMA WESTON HENRIQUES, IMPRISONED MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 61
(1982); MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 1 (reporting figures for parents incarcerated in state
prison); TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, HARD DATA ON HARD TIMES: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE, AND VISITATION 6
(2004), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=123/Hard%2Bdata.pdf; see also
BRENDA G. MCGOWAN & KAREN L. BLUMENTHAL, WHY PUNISH THE CHILDREN? A STUDY OF
CHILDREN OF WOMEN PRISONERS 56 tbl. 1 (1978); Ellen Barry, Legal Issues for Prisoners
with Children, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 147, 148 (Katherine Gabel &
Denise Johnston eds., 1995); Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 562; Lanette P. Dalley,
Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children: Their Often Conflicting Legal Rights, 22 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2000); Sally Day, Mothers in Prison: How the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 Threatens Parental Rights, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 226 (2005). But
see Moses, supra note 27, at 98 (revealing that in the majority of cases, in a study of in-
carcerated women in Illinois, reviewed children were placed in foster care prior to the
mother’s first period of incarceration).
62. MEYERSON ET AL., supra note 47, at 1.
63. It is important to note, however, that the studies associate recidivism with in-
creased potential for family violence. Kemper & Rivara, supra note 36, at 263 tbl. 3.
64. For example, despite the public and media attention paid to mothers who kill their
children, the reality is that most imprisoned mothers are not incarcerated for harming
their children and statistics show that less than one percent of homicides committed by
females involve children less than thirteen years. Loper, supra note 45, at 92.
65. Luke, supra note 16, at 935.
172 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 18:161
by gender neutral laws and policies that are developed with men as
a starting point. Although men imprisoned for crimes are not priv-
ileged in the sense that they are necessarily treated better, women
who are subject to the same standards and policies for a variety of
reasons are more adversely affected.66 The weight of sentencing, in-
carceration, and separation from their communities and families has
a greater and more negative impact on women.
II. BARRIERS TO PRESERVING FAMILY UNITY IN FAMILIES WITH AN
INCARCERATED MOTHER
The rising rates of incarceration for women have resulted in a
corresponding increase in parental terminations.67 Child welfare
policies and federal laws which make achieving permanency for
children in state care a fundamental goal and the basis for parental
terminations do not adequately address the very real and significant
barriers to maintaining contact while incarcerated.68 For many incar-
cerated women, being “locked up” creates a childcare gap which many
must rely on others to fill.69 Approximately eleven percent of mothers
66. Clarke, supra note 37, at 264.
67. Ronnie Halperin & Jennifer L. Harris, Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers
with Children in Foster Care: A Policy Vacuum, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 339, 339 (2004).
68. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)). A number of states allow courts to
consider incarceration or the length of incarceration as a factor without necessarily re-
quiring proof or risk of harm to the child. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(4) (LexisNexis
2011) (listing “conviction of and imprisonment for a felony” as one factor that can be consid-
ered in determining whether to terminate parental rights); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.011(2),
47.10.080(o) (2010) (allowing the state to consider the incarceration of a parent when
determining whether a child is in need of aid); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(3)
(2010) (listing long term confinement of the parent as one basis for finding a parent
unfit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(3) (2010) (allowing for the termination of
parental rights where the parent failed to plan for the child’s needs and is incapable of
discharging parental responsibility due to extended or repeated incarceration); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (LexisNexis 2010) (noting that being convicted of certain crimes
creates a rebuttable presumption of depravity); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341
(2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005 (2010); 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-2 (LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269 (2010); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020 (West 2010); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712A.19b (LexisNexis 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-423, 41-3-
609 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02, 27-20-
44 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A,
§ 7006-1.1 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.502 (2010); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 634a,
634b (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-26.1, 26-8A-27
(LexisNexis 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001,
161.002(b), 161.007 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-508 (LexisNexis 2010); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2010); Ross, supra note 23, at 178; Stephanie Sherry, When Jail
Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce its Negative Impact on Children of Incarcerated
Parents, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 380, 382–83 (2010).
69. Halperin & Harris, supra note 67, at 340.
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in prison with a minor child reported having a child in a foster care sys-
tem.70 As primary caregivers, women are more frequently faced with
having their children placed in foster care than men, and that number
has been increasing over time.71 Even when extended family is avail-
able to help care for these children, the family may be too stressed by
economic and other factors to provide adequate care without signifi-
cant state assistance.72 Many children, like Omarian, are placed with
relatives when their mother is incarcerated.73 However, much like in
Omarian’s case, a large percentage of these children eventually end up
in state care.74 
This breach in familial support is primarily an issue for women
rather than men (poor women rather than the well-off) and can be
exaggerated by substance abuse problems, a history of child or do-
mestic abuse, and mental illness.75 One recent study of incarcerated
women in Illinois found that the majority of women had a child in
state care prior to the woman’s imprisonment.76 The reliance on foster
care prior to incarceration may be related to behaviors and conditions
that eventually led to the arrest and incarceration of the mother. Be-
haviors such as drug use and illegal behaviors which may be related
to the underlying causes of these women’s incarceration may have led
to their children entering foster care some time prior to the women’s
incarceration.77 The child welfare system is ill-equipped to deal with
70. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 5; see also MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 4.
71. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 10; see Dalley, supra note 61, at 14 (noting that
when mothers are incarcerated children often end up in foster care).
72. Jeremy Travis et al., Families Left Behind: The Hidden Costs of Incarceration and
Reentry, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR. (June 2005), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf
/310882_families_left_behind.pdf; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 144; MUMOLA,
supra note 16, at 1 (reporting figures for parents incarcerated in state prison); Barry,
supra note 61, at 148; Beckerman, supra note 41, at 10; Block & Potthast, supra 41, at
561; Day, supra note 61, at 226; Ross, supra note 23, at 6.
73. In re Omarian R., No. H14CP06008614A, 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1427, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2008); see also State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. V.N., 279
S.W.3d 306, 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that the grandmother had custody of the
minor child while the mother was in prison, the child was placed with an Aunt when the
grandmother was jailed on a DUI charge, and the child was placed in state care when
the aunt was arrested for a DUI); Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 562.
74. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 144; MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 1 (reporting
figures for parents incarcerated in state prison); Barry, supra note 61, at 148; Beckerman,
supra note 41, at 10; Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 562; Day, supra note 61, at 226;
Loper, supra note 45, at 91; Ross, supra note 23, at 6.
75. Angela Wolf et al., The Incarceration of Women in California, 43 U.S.F. L. REV.
139, 142–43 (2008).
76. Moses, supra note 27, at 98.
77. Mary Barr, The Faceless Offender: The Effects of Incarceration on Families,
Women, and Minorities, in 2 ATLA 2001 ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 2071
(Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. ed., 2001), available at Westlaw ATLA-CLE (stating that
85% of incarcerated women are non-violent drug offenders); Wolf et al., supra note 75, at
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incarcerated parents and does not provide for long-term childcare
needs.78 The chronic conditions imprisoned mothers often face and the
lack of childcare during periods of incarceration creates a need for ex-
tended care for the children of incarcerated mothers.79 However, cur-
rent policies are inapposite to these needs.80 These families may be
trapped in a cycle of poverty, addiction, child and domestic abuse, and
mental illness which makes them vulnerable to arrest and subsequent
incarceration.81 At the same time, federal and state law and policy
increase the likelihood that they might lose their parental rights.82
The federal statute designed to make permanency “‘in a safe and
stable home’ . . . the goal for all of the children who enter foster care”
makes it difficult for incarcerated women to retain their parental
rights.83 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”) creates
incentives and places pressure on states to move children from state
care to permanent homes under a time-table.84 According to the ASFA,
permanency hearings must be held within twelve months of the initial
142 (“Imprisoned women also tend to have . . . significant substance abuse issues . . . .”).
78. Halperin & Harris, supra note 67, at 340 (asserting that “child welfare policies
governing the management and ultimate disposition of these children have not been
tailored to the circumstances of parental incarceration”); see also Genty, supra note 40,
at 545 (stating that given the lack of consistent formal mechanisms to track the children
of the incarcerated, these statistics may under report the number of children of in-
carcerated parents who are in foster care).
79. Moses, supra note 27, at 98.
80. MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 1 (finding that 10% of mothers and 2% of fathers in
state prison report a child living in a foster home or agency).
81. Jane C. Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance Abuse,
and Child Welfare: The Legal System’s Response, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 88, 91–95
(1999). The authors note the use of drugs and alcohol by domestic violence victims and
“make them particularly unsympathetic parties in abuse and neglect proceedings.” Id.
at 94; Wolf et al., supra note 75, at 143 (finding that women may rely on illegal drugs to
“self medicate” for depression, stress, or emotional pain caused by abuse).
82. Nell Bernstein estimates that “thirty-four states now have statutes in place that
explicitly cite parental incarceration as a criterion for termination of parental rights.”
BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 150; see also Dalley, supra note 61, at 16–17. A number of
states find incarceration is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights but still
look to efforts made by the parent while imprisoned to maintain the parental bond. It is
unclear how realistic these expectations are given the barriers for incarcerated mothers
to maintaining contact with their children. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy A. v. Catholic
Soc. Serv. of the Diocese of Harrisburg, Pa., Inc., 517 A.2d 1244–45 (Pa. 1986) (holding that
a parent’s responsibilities are not tolled during incarceration, and therefore “we must
inquire whether the parent has utilized those resources at his or her command while in
prison [to continue] a close relationship with the child”); In re I.G., 939 A.D.2d 950, 953
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (“Incarceration alone is not sufficient to support termination.”).
83. Ross, supra note 23, at 178 (quoting Executive Memorandum on Adoption and
Alternate Permanent Placement of Children in the Public Child Welfare System, 32
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2513 (Dec. 14, 1996)).
84. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §§ 201–03, 305(b)(2)
(7)(A), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
2012] “THE GOOD MOTHER” 175
removal of the child out of the home and into foster care.85 Children
who are out of the home and in foster care for fifteen of the last
twenty-two months must be moved toward permanency, and the ASFA
requires states, with some exceptions, to file petitions to terminate
parental rights.86 State agencies are required to make “reasonable
efforts” to reunite families and to maintain family ties.87 However,
what constitutes “reasonable efforts” is left up to the states and in-
dividual state agencies to define.88 A number of researchers have
been critical of the “reunification” efforts of state social welfare agen-
cies and suggest a lack of sufficient and consistent effort to reunite
troubled families.89 These concerns are magnified in families in which
the separation between parent and child is a result of a parent’s incar-
ceration. Far too frequently, there is insufficient support for parents
who, because of their incarceration, are unable to follow a perma-
nency plan put in place for them by case workers.
While the ASFA may have been motivated by good intentions to
benefit children, the intersection of federal and state law may be re-
sponsible for the significant increase in the termination of parental
rights of incarcerated mothers.90 A significant number of states permit
85. Id. § 302. The Act also “awarded states $4,000 per adoption in excess of the state’s
average number of adoptions prior to 1997.” Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts:
Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 259, 278 (2003).
86. Adoption and Safe Families Act § 103; Crossley, supra note 85, at 278–79 (“A state
can be excused from this obligation if: (1) the state has placed the child in the care of a
relative; (2) the state can provide a compelling reason for maintaining the parental
relationship; or (3) the state has failed to provide reasonable efforts to reunite the
family.” (citation omitted)). Crossley critiques the “reasonable efforts” exception of the
ASFA as “a hollow requirement” since it “stresses terminating parental rights over
providing services . . . [and] only applies to the failure to provide those services the state
deems necessary,” and provides little guidance to the states about how to fulfill the
requirement. Id. at 292; Halperin & Harris, supra note 67, at 340 (arguing that the
failure to address the needs of incarcerated mothers with children in foster care
compromises the women’s rights as parents).
87. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 101, 94
Stat. 500; Benites, supra note 16, at 205.
88. Benites, supra note 16, at 204–05.
89. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 151–52.
90. Id. at 149.
Many prisoners do stints even for minor infractions that exceed ASFA’s six-
and fifteen-month time limits. In New York state, more than 90 percent of
women convicted of felonies, including low-level nonviolent crimes, will serve
at least eighteen months—three months more than the longer of the ASFA
time limits. Nationwide, the average term being served by parents in state
prison is eighty months.
Id.; Beckerman, supra note 41, at 12; Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 562–63; Halperin
& Harris, supra note 67, at 340 (noting that “the number of children with parents in
prison has become an increasingly larger proportion of all children in nonrelative foster
care”); Benites, supra note 16, at 218. In fact some believe the increase may be as much as
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courts to weigh incarceration as a factor in assessing whether paren-
tal rights should be terminated.91 The standards for determining when
a parent’s right to raise their child should be terminated based on
incarceration are varied and vague.92 States typically apply a two
step process for determining whether to terminate parental rights.93
First, a finding that the parent is unfit or unsuitable is made under a
clear and convincing standard.94 Then, if a parent is found unfit, most
states weigh whether terminating parental rights would be in the
child’s best interests.95 However, states differ sharply in the applicable
standard of review and in how fitness is determined.96 In states in
250%. Genty, supra note 21, at 1678; Travis, supra note 16, at 34.
91. See, e.g., K.A.P. v. D.P. and C.P.,11 So.3d 812, 819 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (“[T]here
has never been a dispute in our cases that current imprisonment extending for a long
period during the child’s minority may be a sufficient basis for a finding that the im-
prisoned parent is unable or unwilling to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for
the child, especially when the evidence shows that the imprisonment prevents the parent
from performing ordinary parental duties.”); R.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 847
So.2d 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
92. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 97–100.
93. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have little doubt that the Due
Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some show-
ing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s
best interest.’ ” (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring))). “[T]he interest of parents in their relationship with their chil-
dren is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117–18 (1996) (“[A] parent’s desire
for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’
is an important interest . . . .” (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981))). The Supreme Court recognized that it is a parent’s fundamental right “to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); see, e.g., Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) (finding that the Oregon Compulsory
Education Act violated parents’ “liberty” interests in raising and educating their children);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the right to raise one’s children
is “essential”).
94. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 (rejecting New York’s use of a “preponderance” standard
in parental termination proceedings as a violation of a parent’s due process rights).
95. Id. at 779–80.
96. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(III) (2011) (“The court may order a ter-
mination of the parent-child legal relationship upon the . . . [l]ong-term confinement of the
parent of such duration that the parent is not eligible for parole for at least six years . . . or
. . . if the child is under six years of age . . . , the long-term confinement of the parent of such
duration that the parent is not eligible for parole for at least thirty-six months . . . .”); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (“The parent is incarcerated and will
be unavailable to care for the child for a period of at least one (1) year from the date of the
child’s entry into foster care and there is no appropriate relative placement available
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which incarceration of the parent plays a role in determining fitness,
there is a lack of consistency among the states as to whether courts
should weigh the nature of the crime committed, the length of incarcer-
ation, the fact of incarceration, or the parent’s efforts to communicate
with her child after being imprisoned.97 The fitness and the best inter-
ests measures used by courts in parental termination proceedings
are vague and rely greatly on the exercise of judicial discretion.98
Drug laws and harsh sentencing policies for drug-related and
nonviolent crimes result in lengthy sentences for a great number of
imprisoned women.99 Since the average prison sentences are longer
than the twenty-two month period specified in the ASFA,100 the av-
erage incarcerated mother may be faced with efforts to terminate
her parental rights primarily because of the length of her incarcera-
tion alone.101 In fact, one researcher reported a 250 percent increase
in cases terminating parental rights due to parental incarceration.102
While termination statutes are gender neutral and are applied to
fathers as well as mothers, they impact women more significantly
since women are more likely to be single parents who lived with
their children immediately prior to incarceration.103 The result is to
undervalue the relationship between mother and child and to allow
the termination of parental rights to become a de facto punishment for
the crimes for which she was convicted.104 The move to permanency
during this period of time.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12)–(13) (LexisNexis
2011) (“The parent is incarcerated . . . and will not be available to care for the child for at
least eighteen months . . . [or] [t]he parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated in-
carceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A,
§ 1-4-904(12) (2011) (stating that one consideration is “the duration of incarceration and its
detrimental effect on the parent/child relationship”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)
(Q)(ii) (West 2011) (“The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship
if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence [that the parent has] knowingly
engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent’s . . . confinement or
imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date
of filing the petition.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-508 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating
parental rights if the parent is incarcerated for such a time “that the child will be
deprived of a normal home for more than one year”).
97. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 150–51 (discussing differences between the
Georgia and New York systems); Dalley, supra note 61, at 19–23.
98. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 98–99.
99. MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 5; Wolf et al., supra note 75, at 140–41.
100. Travis, supra note 16, at 34; see also Crossley, supra note 85, at 292.
101. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 149; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
102. Travis, supra note 16, at 34 (citing Genty, supra note 21, at 1678).
103. Baunach, supra note 46, at 157; Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The
Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children, in 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 133, 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008).
104. Genty, supra note 21, at 1678–79 (noting that family separation is a collateral
consequence of incarceration, finding that damage to the family relationship is often an
indirect consequence of incarceration).
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under the ASFA does not adequately reflect the reality of prison sen-
tences currently imposed and ignores the bonds between mother and
child that developed prior to incarceration.
In addition, the fact of incarceration and the length of sentences
create barriers to parenting from prison that uniquely affect women.
Prison facilities for women are frequently placed farther from their
homes than prisons for men.105 In fact, most incarcerated mothers are
imprisoned more than 100 miles from their families, while federal pris-
oners are housed at far greater distances not infrequently in states
other than their home state.106 This adds to the high cost of staying
in touch by making it more expensive and time consuming to visit a
female prisoner.107 In addition, prison and jail facilities are designed
with security as a primary goal and do not typically provide convenient
and family-friendly visiting areas.108 Telephone contact is maintained
through collect calls at exorbitant rates, and visiting is often made so
difficult, expensive, and time consuming that many families cannot
afford to do so often.109
105. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 78. Prisoners may also be housed outside the state
in which they live and were sentenced. Id. at 90–91; see also MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 5
(observing that 64% of parents incarcerated in state prison and 80% of parents incarcer-
ated in federal prison are housed more than 100 miles from their last place of residence);
Travis, supra note 16, at 37 (describing the large cost to families of maintaining telephone
contact, and new programs that use the internet to improve family contact with prisoners
as well as programs to bring children to distant prisons).
106. It is estimated that 60% of parents incarcerated in state prison and 84% of parents
incarcerated in federal prison are housed more than 100 miles from their children. See
MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 5.
107. Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 565; Genty, supra note 21, at 1675; Denise
Johnston & Katherine Gabel, Incarcerated Parents, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
PARENTS 16–17 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995); Travis, supra note 16, at
36; see also Murray & Farrington, supra note 103, at 188–89 (suggesting that prisoners
would be better able to cope after their release if funds were provided during their
incarceration to allow family to visit). Bernstein asserts that the cost of collect calls from
prison is “as much as twenty times that of standard collect calls” in an arrangement that
provides large profits for states as well as the phone companies. BERNSTEIN, supra note
16, at 86. Some families have unsuccessfully attempted to sue to obtain compensation for
exorbitant telephone fees. See, e.g., Zachary R. Dowdy, Families of Prisoners Sue State Over
Phone Charges, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.newsday.
com/news/region-state/families-of-prisonerssuestate-over-phone-charges-1 .1519293; see
also Nicholas H. Weil, Dialing While Incarcerated: Calling for Uniformity Among Prison
Telephone Regulations, 19 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 427, 431 (2005) (noting the number of
Circuit Courts that have heard constitutional claims for inmates’ rights to phone calls);
Keeping in Touch with a Parent in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at A14 (reporting
on an effort in Congress to require fair telephone rates in prisons).
108. Arditti, supra note 37, at 116; Travis, supra note 16, at 36–37. But see Tanya
Krupat, Invisibility and Children’s Rights: The Consequences of Parental Incarceration,
29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39, 42 (2007) (discussing enhanced visitation programs in New
York, Tennessee, Arkansas, and California).
109. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 86; Arditti, supra note 37, at 116; Sametz, supra
note 57, at 298, 301.
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A review of cases reveals that courts can be critical of parental
efforts to maintain a relationship with their children while incarcer-
ated and have been willing to terminate parental rights in many of
these cases.110 In reviewing termination appeals, some courts have
found that incarceration does not discharge a parent’s statutory obli-
gation to provide for her child with a continuing relationship through
communication and visitation.111 For example, some state courts have
held that incarceration is no excuse for a parent failing to communi-
cate and keep contact with her child.112 Courts reason that a parent
who is prevented from maintaining meaningful contact with a child
by his incarceration and who thereby risks having his parental rights
terminated “cannot object to the natural consequences brought about
by his own voluntary commission of criminal acts.”113 Courts are also
skeptical of mothers who fail to get the assistance they need until
they are imprisoned, reflecting a disconnect between the state’s ex-
pectations of mothering and the reality of parenting for poor, single
mothers.114 For example, in In the Interest of E.M.H., Minor Child,
B.M.B., the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed a decision to terminate
a mother’s parental rights.115 The court found:
The State offered Brandi a wide array of services, which she did
not participate in or respond to, beginning in 2005 with her first
child. . . . [S]he did not begin participating in substance abuse
treatment until after she was incarcerated. However, once incar-
cerated, Brandi did become involved in a substance abuse treat-
ment program and participated in a parenting class at the prison.
110. See, e.g., In re J.L., 924 N.E.2d 961, 968 (Ill. 2010). Note that the Supreme Court
in Santosky v. Kramer requires courts determining parental termination matters to
require “clear and convincing” evidence that the parent is unfit. Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769 (1982). However, the heightened standard alone has been insufficient to
prevent terminations primarily due to separation as a result of incarceration.
111. In re B.F., No. 2008 CA 11, 2008 WL 4447700, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2008)
(finding clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children’s best interest to termi-
nate the mother’s parental rights where the mother was incarcerated, could have chosen
to participate in a residential treatment program but decided to go to prison, was not due
to be released from prison until children would have been in agency’s custody for approx-
imately 18 months, and had made little, if any, progress on her case plan).
112. In re Omarian R., No. H14CP06008614A, 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1427, at
*10–12 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2008).
113. In re T.G.Y., 631 S.E.2d 467, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also In re T.B.R., 480
S.E.2d 901, 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “criminal history of repetitive incar-
cerations for the commission of criminal offenses . . . constitutes an additional factor
which may be considered” in determining whether termination of parental rights is in
the best interests of the child).
114. See, e.g., In re B.F., 2008 WL 4447700, at *3 (affirming the termination of the
parental rights of an imprisoned mother who chose prison in place of treatment and later
enrolled in parenting classes in prison).
115. In re E.M.H., No. 08-0701, 2008 WL 2906510 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008 July 30, 2008).
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She also obtained her GED and maintained a job at the prison
facility. . . . [W]e conclude the State’s efforts towards reunifica-
tion throughout the juvenile court proceedings were reasonable.
Brandi, however, did not make it a priority to take advantage of
the offered services until it was too late. . . . Brandi’s incarceration
does not excuse her inability to care for Emily.116
The court makes no examination of whether environmental
stressors made it difficult for Brandi to take advantage of the assis-
tance being offered until separated from her community through
incarceration.117 The factors that may have led to and fueled her
substance abuse are not assessed, nor does the court reckon with the
known links between a history of abuse and substance abuse.118 Given
the magnitude of the issues and rights at stake, a more thorough in-
quiry into the causes of Brandi’s conduct, and what community re-
sources could be made available to her to keep the family together,
should have occurred. Parental termination statutes give judges a
great deal of discretion in weighing incarceration as a factor and the
decision is “value-laden . . . based on social policy, competing priorities,
and law.”119 Under this approach, incarceration may be seen as a sign
116. Id. at *2–3.
117. Id. (containing no discussion of the issue of environmental factors related to
substance abuse).
118. See Murphy & Potthast, supra note 81, at 91–95; Wolf et al., supra note 75, at 143.
119. Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental
Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 402 (1996). The
amount of time that triggers state intervention varies from state to state and from case
to case. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(III) (2011) (“The court may order the
termination of the parent-child legal relationship upon . . . [l]ong-term confinement of the
parent of such duration that the parent is not eligible for parole for at least six years . . .
or . . . if the child is under six years of age . . . , the long-term confinement of the parent
of such duration that the parent is not eligible for parole for at least thirty-six months
. . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (“The parent is incarcerated
and will be unavailable to care for the child for a period of at least one (1) year from the
date of the child’s entry into foster care and there is no appropriate relative placement
available during this period of time.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12)–(13)
(LexisNexis 2011) (“The parent is incarcerated . . . and will not be available to care for
the child for at least eighteen months . . . [or] [t]he parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and
the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child.”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(12) (2011) (stating that one consideration is “the duration of
incarceration and its detrimental effect on the parent/child relationship”); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q)(ii) (West 2011) (“The court may order termination of the parent-child
relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . [that the parent has]
knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent’s . . . confinement
or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date
of filing the petition.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-508(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2011) (allowing
termination if parents are incarcerated for such a time “that the child will be deprived of
a normal home for more than one year.”). Some states allow courts to consider incar-
ceration of a substantial or extended period of time. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(viii) (2011) (“The parent is sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period
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of unfitness, abandonment, or neglect, all of which imply the need to
terminate parental rights to safeguard the child.120 These statutes
permit courts to terminate rights of an incarcerated parent when the
court determines that “continuing the parental relationship would be
harmful to the child,” which, under this view, does not require proof
that actual contact is detrimental but may presuppose harm based
on factors such as the length of the sentence and the amount of con-
tact between the parent and child.121
The focus in the inquiry in termination proceedings is placed on
the culpability of the mother and not the “nexus” between the
mother’s behavior and any direct harm to the child.122 The systemic
undervaluation of these connections may be the result of a persis-
tent and narrow mythology that idealizes mothers and that is not
of time that would constitute a substantial period of the juvenile’s life.”); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(3) (2011) (“The [parent] is incapable of discharging parental respon-
sibilities due to extended or repeated incarceration.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(d)(1)
(LexisNexis 2011) (“The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated
will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age
of 18 years . . . .”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(6) (2011) (“[T]he parent has been con-
victed and sentenced to a period of incarceration of such duration that the parent will not
be able to care for the child for an extended period of time . . . .”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-
7(a)(2)(i) (2011) (stating that “imprisonment, for a duration as to render it improbable for
the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time,” is one consideration); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(4) (2011) (“[T]he court may find that good cause exists for
termination of parental rights of a parent who . . . [i]s incarcerated and is unavailable to
care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority, considering the child’s
age and the child’s need for care by an adult.”).
120. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 119, at 420–421 (describing a mother who lost
parental rights, in part, because of the fact of her incarceration).
121. R.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 847 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003); K.A.P. v. D.P.,11 So. 3d 812, 819 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
[T]here has never been a dispute in our cases that current imprisonment
extending for a long period during the child’s minority may be a sufficient
basis for a finding that the imprisoned parent is unable or unwilling to
discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child, especially when the
evidence shows that the imprisonment prevents the parent from performing
ordinary parental duties.
Id.
122. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(III) (2011); Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of
Family & Protective Servs., 176 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(1)(G) (2002)); see, e.g., In re C.M.O., 901 So. 2d 1168, 1171 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (“[I]mprisonment may not be used as an excuse to escape parental obligations.”);
Adoption of Serge, 750 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (“Physical unavailability of
the parent to provide day to day care for the child, including for reasons of incarceration,
was relevant evidence of unfitness.”); In re Isabella C., 852 A.2d 550, 558 (R.I. 2004) (“[T]he
trial justice is not required to consider parole eligibility, he or she is only required to con-
sider the probable duration of imprisonment at the time of the termination.” (quoting In
re Mercedes V., 788 A.2d 1152, 1153 (R.I. 2001))); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,” Family and Criminal Law,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 710 (1998) (explaining that in child welfare proceedings, courts
focus on “mothers’ lifestyles and child-rearing practices rather than on harm to the child”).
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sufficiently broad to view incarcerated women as good mothers.123
Nor does it seem to leave room for a notion of community mothering
or of working within communities to build community-based support
for mothers and families in need of assistance. Motherhood has car-
ried a sense of idealism against which many have either rallied or
struggled.124 It carries with it cultural and political meaning and has
been a source of protection and derision for many.125 Mothers who are
able to mimic the societal ideal of mothering receive the greatest
praise and protections although active debate about ideal mothering
continues.126 Women, even those who work outside the home, are
still largely viewed as “the keeper of the home.”127 Women who defy
cultural norms about mothers and mothering often face criticism
and some level of resistance.128 Incarcerated women challenge soci-
etal norms about mothering and stand counter to generally accepted
views about how “good mothers” conduct themselves.129
More than women who work or women who in other ways chal-
lenge societal perceptions of womanhood, incarcerated women more
directly challenge established perceptions about families, parenting,
123. Brenda V. Smith, Reforming, Reclaiming or Reframing Womanhood: Reflections
on Advocacy for Women in Custody, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 5 (2007) (noting the
history of the women’s movement and the conflict between the focus on women in prison
and motherhood and the failure of women in prison to conform to motherhood ideals).
124. See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN 22–23 (2004)
(positing that mothers are subject to a heightened standard of conduct that can generate
negative responses when those standards are not met); Murphy, supra note 122, at 761
(noting the “law’s view of mother as self-sacrificing nurturer and as equal wage earner”).
125. DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 124, at 206.
126. For example, works by a “Tiger Mother” who was seen as too demanding, and an-
other who opted to give up custody of her children to her husband in order to pursue her
career when she decided she did not want to be a mother any more, received considerable
attention and criticism for their style of mothering. AMY CHUA, BATTLE HYMN OF THE
TIGER MOTHER (2011) (telling a mother’s story about parenting and raising children the
“Chinese” way which involves strict and rigid rules and expectations); Rahna Reiko
Rizzuto, Why I Left My Children, SALON.COM (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.salon.com/life
/feature/2011/02/28/leaving_my_children. The author gave up custody of her two sons
when she realized she did not want to be a mother anymore and preferred instead to focus
on her career. Id.; Kate Zernike, Retreat of the ‘Tiger Mother,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011,
at ST1 (noting the controversial nature Chua’s book).
127. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 15–16 (1989); Jill Laster, Time Crunch for Female
Scientists: They Do More Housework than Men, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), Jan. 19,
2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Female-Scientists-Do-More/63641/; Deborah Solomon,
Women’s Work: What Men Won’t Do, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com
/economics/2009/08/06/womens-work-what-men-wont-do/# (discussing a Bureau of Labor
Statistics Report showing women do more household work than men).
128. DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 124, at 22–23.
129. Id.
2012] “THE GOOD MOTHER” 183
and care-taking.130 These women are geographically distant from
their children.131 Visitation and physical contact with their children
is out of their control and, according to studies, is often inconsistent
at best but more often minimal or nonexistent.132 Communicating
through telephone calls is an expensive and limited option, and
incarcerated women may find sending cards and letters a difficult
and ineffective means of expressing their complicated feelings for
their children and about the situation in which they find them-
selves.133 Women who commit crimes, “are viewed as more pathologi-
cal” than men who commit crimes.134 Women who commit crimes,
are incarcerated, and fail to maintain regular communication with
their children may find it difficult to overcome common understand-
ings of how “good mothers” behave. Even today, the role of mother
is still a defining characteristic for women, and mothers who fall
short of expectations are viewed negatively.135 Women are judged,
in part, by their devotion and commitment to their children and are
not good mothers until they devote most of their time and energy to
being mothers.136
Termination proceedings result in an evaluation of mothering
that holds incarcerated women to a high and unrealistic standard
and creates timetables for addressing shortcomings that fail to pro-
vide sufficient time to address the difficult and wide-ranging issues
these women may be facing. In addition, the models of mothering to
which these mothers are held may reflect standards to which all
parents should aspire but are ones to which most mothers probably
fall short. For example, in In re J.L., in upholding the termination
of the parents’ parental rights, the Illinois Supreme Court noted
transgressions such as leaving a “knife on the table with the point
outward,” allowing the children to run “around wildly” and failing
to acknowledge children when they wanted to talk about their day
at school.137 While perhaps demonstrating errors in judgment, such
130. See STACEY L. SHIPLEY & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE FEMALE HOMICIDE OFFENDER:
SERIAL MURDER AND THE CASE OF AILEEN WUORNOS xii–xiii (2004).
131. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 78; MUMOLA, supra note 16, at 5.
132. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 78–81 (noting obstacles to family friendly visits,
including bulletproof glass, long lines, and a lengthy approval process, and humiliating
screening processes); Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 566 (indicating that most vis-
iting rooms are uncomfortable and may heighten children’s anxieties about the visit).
133. See Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 563–64; Luke, supra note 16, at 934;
Sametz, supra note 57, at 299.
134. SHIPLEY & ARRIGO, supra note 130, at 11.
135. See DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 124, at 22–23.
136. Id.
137. In re J.L., 924 N.E.2d 961, 964–65 (Ill. 2010).
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parenting failures seem to fall short of demonstrating a lack of
fitness to parent. Each of the transgressions cited by the court
almost certainly would not lead to a termination of rights had the
mother not had a history of incarceration, mental illness and domes-
tic violence.138
The mother in In re J.L. admittedly falls far from an ideal of
mothering, but whether her failures should result in the permanent
severing of her parental ties to her children, and whether a middle
class woman would be held to the same standard, are important
questions that the court in the case is free to ignore, since the pre-
vailing standard does not require such an inquiry.139 At issue in the
appeal was whether the parents had been given sufficient time to
address their parenting deficiencies, particularly given the mental
illness and abuse issues facing the mother.140 Even though the court
acknowledges the difficulties an incarcerated parent may face in try-
ing to improve his or her parenting skills, it concludes that the time
period a parent is given to make such progress is not tolled by the
time spent in prison.141 In fact, the court ultimately finds that “in
the interest of judicial economy,” it would not remand the case to be
decided, and it instead upheld the parental termination.142
The mother in In re J.L., like many incarcerated women, is deal-
ing with a number of complicated and interrelated psychological and
mental health problems that are impossible to address in the time
periods prescribed by state and federal standards.143 Incarcerated
women engage in high levels of drug and alcohol use and frequently
have histories of mental illness and abuse.144 These women may find
it difficult to overcome addiction and mental health issues within the
strict federal and state time-lines. In addition, they face the challenge
of countering the negative stereotypes about the kinds of individuals
who commit crimes, use drugs, and “allow” themselves to be abused.
Women of color may be most impacted by the intersection of
criminal law, child welfare policies and stereotyped thinking:
[W]omen of color remain the most impacted by increased levels
of mass incarceration. These women are more often mothers of
138. See, e.g., In re Faith B., 832 N.E.2d 152, 159 (Ill. 2005) (holding that one factor
indicating unfitness [mental illness] is not sufficient to terminate parental rights).
139. In re J.L., 924 N.E.2d at 966–67.
140. Id. at 964–65.
141. Id. at 968–69.
142. Id. at 970.
143. Wolf et al., supra note 75, at 142–43.
144. Id.
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dependent children. . . . While they are more likely to be nonvio-
lent offenders, they are still viewed as a threat to the moral
conscience of the dominant society since they fail to meet the
standards of appropriate motherhood.145
These women in prison face an additional layer of struggle
against stereotypes about women of color and poor women as moth-
ers.146 Stereotypes about race, ethnicity, and class may affect percep-
tions of mothering.147 Black mothers are often viewed as failing to
live up to society’s image of the ideal mother.148 Black mothers are de-
valued and fall short of the American ideal of motherhood; this has
its roots in slavery. As Patricia Hill Collins notes, African-American
women often struggle against:
[t]he traditional family ideal [that] assigns mothers full respon-
sibility for children and evaluates their performance based on
their ability to procure the benefits of a nuclear family household.
Within this capitalist marketplace model, those women who ‘catch’
legal husbands, who live in single-family homes, who can afford
private school and music lessons for their children, are deemed
better mothers than those who do not.149
The devaluation of the images of poor mothers and mothers of color
creates opportunities for the vague standards for fitness and best
interest to adversely affect poor families and families of color.150 The
stigma associated with being convicted of a crime, spending time in
prison, being a drug user, being poor, and/or being Black or Latina
may affect how these women are perceived and the extent to which
145. McGee et al., supra note 40, at 510 (citing Sharp & Ericksen, Imprisoned Mothers
and Their Children, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT (B.H. Zaitzow & J. Thomas eds., 2003)).
146. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 108 (1993) (ex-
ploring the effects of gender, race, class, and nature of crime on criminal convictions)
[hereinafter Roberts, Motherhood and Crime]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10–11 (1993)
[hereinafter Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy].
147. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 146, at 137 (“Society is less likely to
identify with criminal mothers than with other classes of criminals. . . . Women violate gen-
der norms when they engage in violence or abandon their children in pursuit of crime.”).
148. Murphy, supra note 122, at 691 (“Poor minority women frequently bear the pun-
ishment for deviating from the stereotype of the ideal mother, whereas white middle-
class and wealthy women reap the rewards for being good mothers.”).
149. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 182 (2nd ed. 2000).
150. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 585 (1997); Lenore M.
McWey et al., Parental Rights and the Foster Care System: A Glimpse of Decision Making
in Virginia, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 1031, 1047 (2008); see also Kennedy, supra note 26, at 103.
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they are viewed as capable mothers. These mothers may find it diffi-
cult to convince first social workers and later judges that they are
fit or suitable parents and often fall short of the “best interests” ideal-
ism inherent in the fitness and best interests tests applied in termi-
nation cases.151 The result of devaluing motherhood by those in the
margins—women of color, poor women, incarcerated women—and
applying a best interests idealism to termination proceedings results
in greater numbers of terminations. However, the children affected
do not necessarily find permanent homes, and the number of chil-
dren in foster care continues to climb.152
Incarcerated mothers are in greater need for assistance since
their children are more adversely affected by the incarceration of
their mothers than their fathers.153 Children of incarcerated mothers
may be at greater risk of troubled behavior than the children of in-
carcerated fathers, putting these children at greater risk for engag-
ing in criminal behavior and continuing a legacy of involvement with
the criminal justice system.154 Moreover, studies seem to support the
idea that these children may be more easily pulled into a pattern of
“intergenerational” crime155 and are more likely to engage in illegal
activity.156 It is unclear whether this is the result of exposure to a par-
ent’s criminal behavior, poverty and related environmental stresses, or
other factors.157 Women of color are at the greatest risk of having their
children placed in foster care.158 Children of color are removed from
151. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 103.
152. See Moses, supra note 27, at 98 (“Perhaps most notable is that children of
incarcerated mothers were four times more likely to be ‘still in’ foster care than all other
children. . . . These children linger in foster care until they are 18 when they ‘age out’ of
the system.”); Schetky et al., supra note 27, at 367 (“[S]tudies have shown that once a
child is placed in foster care, he or she has a 50% chance of remaining there 3 years or
longer. Some studies even suggest that a child who has been in foster care for longer
than 18 months has a remote chance of being either adopted or returned home.” (citation
omitted)); Steven M. Cytryn, Note, What Went Wrong? Why Family Preservation
Programs Failed to Achieve their Potential, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 81, 92–94 (2010)
(discussing foster care from its inception and the growth of foster care over time).
153. Wolf et al., supra note 75, at 143.
154. Landreth & Lobaugh, supra note 57, at 157–58.
155. Halperin & Harris, supra note 67, at 339.
156. Landreth & Lobaugh, supra note 57, at 158; Luke, supra note 16, at 933; see also
Murray & Farrington, supra note 103, at 162.
157. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 146–47. Foster care placement triggers the op-
eration of federal provisions that set time requirements for severing the legal ties between
parent and child. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)); Murray & Farrington,
supra note 103, at 163, 171 (claiming that parental imprisonment is a predictor but does
not necessarily have a causal effect).
158. McGee et al., supra note 40, at 510.
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their homes and placed in foster care at a disproportionate rate.159
These children are also more likely to have their legal ties with their
parents severed.160 A number of scholars have taken note of the dispro-
portionate involvement of the state in families of color and poor fam-
ilies and the greater rates at which their children are removed from
their homes and placed in foster care.161 It is not clear that the chil-
dren, their parents, or their communities are well served by these ef-
forts, and it is instead more likely that the permanent removal of these
children does significant harm.
Many of the women adversely affected by the intersection of the
increasing reliance on incarceration and the effort to achieve perma-
nency for children face a host of social and economic issues which
make it difficult for them to provide for their children.162 In fact, many
come from communities that lack adequate housing, schools, jobs, and
drug and alcohol treatment centers.163 The result is that these women
may find it difficult to provide for basic needs and get the assistance
they need to cope with the stresses of living at the margins of society
in a manner that would satisfy child welfare agencies and judges in
parental terminations proceedings.164 A disconnect exists between
what the federal and state standards and goals for child welfare ex-
pect of these mothers and what they can reasonably provide under
the circumstances and in the communities in which they often live.
An example of the creation of standards for parenting that con-
tribute to the termination of the parental rights of women who live
with incarceration as a fact of life is presented in State of Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services v. V.N., which upholds the termi-
nation of parental rights of an incarcerated mother one month before
her release from prison.165 The case is illustrative of the disconnect
159. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171,
172–73 (2003); Antoinette Greenaway, Note, When Neutral Policies Aren’t So Neutral:
Increasing Incarceration Rates and the Effect of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 on the Parental Rights of African–American Women, 17 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 247,
256–57 (2002–2004).
160. Roberts, supra note 159, at 172–73; Greenaway, supra note 159, at 256–57.
161. Roberts, supra note 159, at 172–73; Greenaway, supra note 159, at 256–57.
162. REIMAN, supra note 22, at 77–110 (noting that for the same criminal behavior,
the poor are more likely to be arrested, charged, convicted, sentenced to prison, and are giv-
en longer prison terms than members of the middle and upper classes); see also Acoca &
Raeder, supra note 52, at 137; John Hagan & Ronit Donovitzer, Collateral Consequences
of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121,
134–37 (1999); Luke, supra note 16, at 930; Poehlmann, supra note 22, at 333, 339; Traci
Schlesinger, The Cumulative Effects of Racial Disparities in Criminal Processing, 7 J.
INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 261, 261 (2007); Travis, supra note 16, at 33–35.
163. Weber, supra note 20, at 644–48.
164. Roberts, supra note 159, at 172–73; Greenaway, supra note 159, at 256–57.
165. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
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between state expectations for incarcerated parents and what it is
likely these parents can accomplish in the relatively short period of
time allotted under the federal standards.166 The mother in V.N. had
been incarcerated twenty times between 2002 and 2008.167 Although
the opinion is unclear as to the nature of all of the mother’s convic-
tions, it does indicate that the mother had been jailed at various
times for theft, driving on a suspended license, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and violating probation.168 At the parental termina-
tion trial, a Department of Children’s Services representative testi-
fied that the mother failed to comply with the permanency plans which
required her to, inter alia, complete alcohol and drug treatment, main-
tain an alcohol and drug-free lifestyle, be able to provide financially
for herself and her child, have stable employment, and have safe and
independent housing.169 According to the opinion, the mother was in-
carcerated for the majority of the time, and, during the five months
she was not in prison, she failed to obtain a job or independent hous-
ing.170 The court further noted that the mother had some visits with
the child but the mother attended only some of them and failed to
attend a birthday party for the child for which she had promised to
bring a cake and presents.171
The mother’s presentation of evidence suggested a more compli-
cated and frustrating picture. Her testimony suggests failures in the
system, particularly a lack of resources to support her family and to al-
low her to be a responsible caring parent.172 The mother testified that
she did not understand
the things she was supposed to do under the permanency plan
and she stated: “. . . I’ve never had to depend on myself so really,
I didn’t even know what place to work. . . .There were services
offered to me, but it wasn’t really nothing to help me. They never
really showed me the way in doing anything. I mean, they would
explain stuff to me, but I’ve, I’ve [sic] never really had to depend
on myself before, so I really didn’t know what to do.”173
From the mother’s perspective, there was a clear disconnect between
what social services expected in order for her to maintain her parental
rights and her understanding of how to carry out the permanency
plan. Although the perception of social services may have been that
166. Id. at 312–13.
167. Id. at 312.
168. Id. at 311.
169. Id. at 309.
170. Id. at 310.
171. V.N., 279 S.W.3d at 310.
172. Id. at 312–13.
173. Id. at 312.
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the failure to visit her child indicated a lack of interest in care-taking,
the mother’s testimony says more about inadequate resources and as-
sistance than a lack of care.174 When asked about whether she cared
for the child, why DCS was unable to get in touch with her, and mis-
sing visitations, the mother testified that she did not have a driver’s
license, car, means of transportation, place to live, job or a phone.175
She further indicated that she did not have a GED.176 When asked
why she failed to attend her child’s birthday party, the mother testified,
“Cause I didn’t have nothing to give her, and I didn’t want to, I
didn’t, I was embarrassed. I didn’t show up, ’cause I didn’t want to
hurt her no more ’cause I didn’t have nothing. I had no job. I had no
way of getting her anything.”177 
It is clear from the case that the mother’s addiction, lack of
education, and joblessness reflects more than mere individual fail-
ings. The mother seems to have lacked basic understandings of how
to proceed to put her life back together and was without family re-
sources to call upon to assist her.178 The case reveals a family in cri-
sis, a family in which at least three female members of the family were
in jail at the same time for addiction-related behaviors.179 The case
reveals a family unable to provide the kind of support that would pre-
vent the State from intervening to care for the child.180 The mother
explained that her failure to more aggressively seek treatment for
her drug addiction was partly due to her reliance on her mother to
care for her child.181 As a result, her mother’s and later her sister’s
incarceration created a childcare gap she was unable to fill and al-
lowed the state to step in and put her child in foster care.182 
The case also reflects the impact of inadequate education, pat-
terns of work in underground markets that can often occur in poor
communities, and the effect of intergenerational crime.183 Although
the mother had neither a high school diploma nor formal employ-
ment, she had an arrangement with a friend, Mr. Landers, to provide
services for him since he was disabled.184 Apparently, the mother
had done general housekeeping for Mr. Landers in the past and he
174. Id. at 312–13.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 313.
177. V.N., 279 S.W.3d at 313.
178. Id. at 312–14.
179. Id. at 307.
180. Id. at 307–8.
181. Id. at 313–14.
182. Id. at 307–8.
183. See Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, “It’s a Family Affair”—The Incarceration of
the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 280 (1994).
184. V.N., 279 S.W.3d at 311–12.
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testified that when she was released from jail, the mother could live
on the second floor of his five-bedroom house and could clean his
house, do laundry, wash dishes, and cook for him in exchange for a
wage.185 The juvenile court noted this job arrangement but expressed
concern that there had “been no proof of what her actual pay was or
pay stubs or bank account records.”186 An informal arrangement to
provide services in exchange for room, board, and pay is not uncom-
mon in poor communities.187 The court, however, searching for more
familiar and concrete evidence of employment, found Mr. Landers’s
representations insufficient proof of the mother’s efforts to secure a
job.188 The State’s expectations for mother as expressed by DSS and
the judge may reflect a disconnect between the standard being ap-
plied and what realistically can be achieved by these parents.
Perhaps the greatest divide in the opinion is the conclusion up-
holding the decision that terminating parental rights was in the child’s
best interest.189 The result ignores less draconian possibilities urged by
the mother during the hearing.190 During her testimony, the mother in-
dicated a strong desire to maintain a connection with her child, stating:
The only thing I ask of the Court whatsoever is that I can get visi-
tation with her. . . . I just want to see her if I’m doing good. . . . I
mean, I can ask for another chance but I’m sure I’m not going to
get [sic], but I want to do everything I can to see my kids because
I love my kids.191
The court, reaching for an all or nothing solution, nonetheless con-
cluded that the mother abandoned her child and that termination of
parental rights would be in the child’s best interests.192 This case, like
many others, would probably have benefitted from efforts to achieve a
middle ground short of termination that might have allowed future con-
tact between the child and his biological family.
185. Id. at 312.
186. Id. at 314.
187. See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
OF THE URBAN POOR xiii (2006) (reporting the use of a barter system in poor communities
as common); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 74–75 (1996).
188. V.N., 279 S.W.3d at 321.
189. Id. at 323 (reaching this conclusion based on findings that the juvenile court did
not err in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights
for abandonment and for failing to substantially comply with the permanency plan despite
the State’s reasonable efforts to assist the mother).
190. Id. at 323.
191. Id. at 313.
192. Id. at 323.
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III. DEVELOPING A CRITICAL RACE FEMINIST APPROACH TO
RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN PRESERVING PARENTAL
RIGHTS AND ENSURING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
There is some disagreement about how best to balance the
myriad interests at stake when a mother who is incarcerated is un-
able to provide family care for her children.193 Some focus on prior-
itizing the child’s need for permanence as a primary goal.194 The
Adoption and Safe Families Act is designed to advance this goal, and
a number of scholars support its implementation.195 Some advocate
for greater intervention in families where there is the potential for
abuse and highlight the need to prioritize a child’s right to safety
and permanence over a parent’s right to the care and custody of her
children.196 Others would prefer to blunt the harsh edge of laws and
policies that result in parental terminations and look for ways to
balance the needs of the children of incarcerated parents with the
rights of these parents.197 At the far end of this view, advocates focus
more on the need to support parental rights and a mother’s right to
parent her children.198
193. See Virginia Sawyer Radding, Intention v. Implementation: Are Many Children,
Removed from Their Biological Families, Being Protected or Deprived?, 6 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 29, 42 (2001) (“[A] large percentage of families involved in the Child
Protection System are living in poverty.”). A number of scholars have addressed the
issue of whether children have constitutional rights to maintain or sever parental ties.
These scholars query whether children have a constitutional right to bond with their
parents. See Johnson, supra note 119, at 399–400 (noting that case law reveals that some
states are “parents’ rights jurisdictions” while others are “child focused jurisdictions” and
that “[t]ermination of parental rights is always a sensitive and difficult issue”); ROSS ET AL.,
supra note 61, at 1 (stating that a child may have an interest in preserving a relation-
ship with a neglectful parent); see also James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense:
States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV.
407, 446–47, 476 (2008).
194. Proponents of the ASFA and short deadlines for terminating parental rights assert
that doing so is in a child’s best interest. There is a vigorous debate about this issue in
legal scholarship. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV.
423, 461 (1983); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 658 (1999).
195. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
196. On a related point, Professor Dwyer also advocates for anticipatory terminations
in families with a history of abuse. See Dwyer, supra note 193, at 472–73.
197. See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 710, 758 (2001). Appell states that the “suggestion that the
parental rights doctrine or family privacy is anachronistic may not comport with the
experiences of the thousands of families who are deprived of the recognition and protec-
tion the doctrine affords.” Id. at 758; see also Philip Genty, Some Reflections About Three
Decades of Working with Incarcerated Mothers, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 11, 14 (2007).
198. Appell, supra note 197, at 787–88.
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While many mothers in parental termination proceedings, like
the mother in State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services
v. V.N., profess a desire to parent their children at a parental termina-
tion hearing, critics would argue that their failure to maintain regular
communication with their children means that terminating parental
rights would serve their child’s best interest.199 The principal objec-
tions to a parental rights approach to thinking about parental termi-
nations are based in concern for the welfare of the child.200 The
assumptions are that parental terminations can serve a child’s best
interest by severing a legal relationship with a parent who has ei-
ther directly or indirectly harmed the child, and that a continued legal
relationship between parent and child will further cause harm to the
child.201 These hypotheses are related to the idea that incarcerated
women have failed in the past and will likely continue to fail to ade-
quately mother their children.202
While incarcerated mothers may fall short of the ideal, and bar-
riers exist to parenting from prison, these obstacles need not necessar-
ily result in inadequate parenting. Despite the difficulties created by
the distance and restrictions of prison life, an approach that errs on
the side of parental terminations fails to account for the continued
mother-child bond that often persists despite the obstacles created
by incarceration.203 Although incarceration presents a number of ob-
stacles to parenting, it does not necessarily break the psychological
bond between the parent and the child.204 The separation due to incar-
ceration is trying for all parents but may be particularly difficult and
painful for mothers.205 These women often report sharing a bond with
their children and, for many, their incarceration is the first major sep-
aration they’ve experienced.206 Mothers in prison report feelings of
guilt, anxiety, and sadness, and are often distressed over their lack
199. See In re Omarian R., No. H14CP06008614A, 2008 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1427,
at *30–32 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2008).
200. Appell, supra note 197, at 732.
201. Id. at 788–89.
202. Baunach, supra note 46, at 155–56.
203. Id. at 158.
204. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 71; DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE:
INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA 95 (2004) (noting that “there is
nothing intrinsically different about these families [with an incarcerated parent] that sets
them apart”); Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 563; Erika London Bocknek et al.,
Ambiguous Loss and Posttraumatic Stress in School-Age Children of Prisoners, 18 J.
CHILD & FAM. STUD. 323, 330 (2009); Loper, supra note 45, at 84. 
205. See Lee, supra note 44, at 239 (addressing the “fragmenting effect” of maternal
incarceration on families); see also Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 561; Luke, supra
note 16, at 930.
206. Baunach, supra note 46, at 157.
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of parenting skills and concern over their children’s well-being.207
Incarcerated mothers assert that being separated from children is a
source of significant stress.208 Dr. Baunach finds that “the psycholog-
ical repercussions may be analogous to those resulting from other
forms of loss, such as death or divorce. The grief response emitted by
inmate-mothers may be characterized by emptiness, helplessness,
anger and bitterness, guilt, and fear of loss or rejection.” 209
Many incarcerated women try to maintain contact and desper-
ately want to be “good mother[s]” despite the barriers to maintaining
contact.210 “Inmate mothers . . . possess positive parenting attitudes
(love, caring, guidance) equivalent to those of mothers who are not
incarcerated,” 211 and their self-esteem is often tied up with their role
as mother.212 Others conclude that “children are important to incar-
cerated mothers: a majority of these mothers apparently want to de-
velop a sense of responsibility as parents,” and “one of the greatest
impacts of the separation is to heighten this interest in children.” 213
Many imprisoned mothers “attempt to maintain some semblance
of the mother role” while in prison.214 Moreover, they report that they
“plan to reunite with [their] children following release from prison,”
seeing their “separation as only temporary.” 215 As a result, the most
damaging aspect of parental incarceration may be the threat of ter-
mination of parental rights.216
The ASFA and state termination standards fail to adequately
account for the mother-child bonds and the barriers and stereotypes
incarcerated mothers face.217 The ASFA should be amended to prohib-
it the application of a statutory time-line to termination proceedings.
Short of doing so, however, parental incarceration should be an ex-
ception to the application of the ASFA time-line, except perhaps for
cases involving violence. In addition, courts should be prohibited from
considering incarceration as a factor in determining parental termi-
nation cases. Under this approach, timetables and standards of re-
view would be adjusted to make it more possible for parents to retain
207. Id. at 157–58; Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 563 (citing L. LeFlore & M.A.
Holston, Perceived Importance of Parenting Behaviors as Reported by Inmate Mothers: An
Exploratory Study, 14 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING SERVICES & REHABILITATION 5 (1989)).
208. Loper, supra note 45, at 84.
209. Baunach, supra note 46, at 157–58.
210. Id. at 155.
211. Block & Potthast, supra note 41, at 563–64.
212. Id. at 563.
213. Baunach, supra note 46, at 165.
214. Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 157.
217. See Benites, supra note 16, at 196.
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their parental rights even when the family is adversely affected
by incarceration.218
Some scholars and activists, including Phillip Genty, have been
critical of the impact of prison policies and the ASFA on incarcerated
parents and have eloquently argued for caution in weighing incar-
ceration as a factor in determining parental fitness, stating that there
is a need to press further and remove incarceration which is unrelated
to a parent’s role as parent from any consideration in a termination
proceeding.219 Under this view, courts would be prohibited from draw-
ing any negative inferences from parental incarceration in determin-
ing parental termination, regardless of the length of incarceration and,
as proposed by Richard Palmer three decades ago, incarceration would
not be considered abandonment.220 Instead, the state would be re-
quired to show proof of direct harm or an attempt to harm the child,
sibling, other parent, or caretaker.221 Courts would adopt a “nexus”
218. For example, Professor Appell suggests that the current standard of review in
parental termination cases is too high and instead proposes a minimal care standard
urging courts to focus on whether a parent could provide minimal care and make de-
cisions for the child as measure of fitness. Appell, supra note 150, at 610 (discussing
minimally adequate care standard).
219. Genty, supra note 197, at 12 (noting the ASFA makes termination of parental
rights more likely for incarcerated parents); Philip M. Genty, The Inflexibility of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act and its Unintended Impact Upon the Children of
Incarcerated Parents and their Families, CHILD WELFARE 360 10 (2008) (stating that the
ASFA make it difficult for incarcerated parents to retain their parental rights because
the length and condition of the separation from their children is out of their control);
Richard D. Palmer, Comment, The Prisoner-Mother and Her Child, 1 CAP. U. L. REV.
127, 129 (1972).
220. Palmer, supra note 219, at 137.
221. The court’s consideration of harm to or an attempt to harm a child’s siblings,
other parent or caretaker is consistent with the scope of protections provided in many
states in domestic violence and abuse cases. In fact, in assessing the relevance of a
parent’s incarceration or conviction of a crime in termination proceedings, a number of
states focus on the nature of the acts committed and the extent to which those acts
clearly demonstrate actual or potential harm to the child or the child’s parent and pa-
rental unfitness. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (2010) (stating a parent must be
convicted of a felony that is “of such a nature as to prove the unfitness of that parent to
have future custody and control of the child”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.5, 366.26
(West 2010) (stating a parent must be “convicted of a felony indicating parental
unfitness”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94 (2010) (stating that incarceration has “a
demonstrable negative effect on the quality of the parent-child relationship”); see also D.C.
CODE §§ 16-2353, 16-2354 (2010); IND. CODE § 31-34-21-5.6 (2010); IOWA CODE §§ 232.102,
232.111, 232.116 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4055; MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
525.1 (LexisNexis 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-603, 93-15-103 (2011); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.447 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 128.105, 128.106,
432B.393 (LexisNexis 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:24-a, 170-C:5 (2010) (in-
carceration and abuse or neglect of a child); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-11.2, 30:4C-15 (West
2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111 (2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-2570 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.132, 13.34.180 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-
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test approach similar to that used in custody matters and require that
any conduct, including conduct relating to the fact of incarceration,
have a demonstrably direct negative impact on the child before being
considered in a termination hearing.222 This approach would raise
the bar for parental termination, shift the burden from the incarcer-
ated parent, and fix the presumption in favor of preserving parent-
child ties.
In order to further protect incarcerated mothers, the ASFA and
parental termination statutes that consider length of separation be-
tween parent and child as a factor should be limited to voluntary
separations and should be prohibited from characterizing imprison-
ment as a voluntary separation.223 Some jurisdictions have begun
efforts to adjust termination standards and proceedings to be more
realistic about the needs of incarcerated families.224 One approach,
recently adopted by New York, has been to expand the period of time
during which an incarcerated mother may meet the permanency plan
goals set for her by the state’s child welfare agency.225 The recently
5 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 48.415 (LexisNexis 2010); see also Michelle Oberman, Judging
Vanessa: Norm Setting and Deviance in the Law of Motherhood, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 337, 337, 359 (2009) (exploring the way the law distinguishes “good” mothers from
“bad” mothers).
222. Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 861–62 (1997).
223. A number of states allow courts to consider incarceration or the length of incar-
ceration as a factor without necessarily requiring proof or risk of harm to the child. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(4) (LexisNexis 2010) (listing “conviction of and imprisonment
for a felony” among factors that courts can consider in making parental termination de-
cisions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (2010) (terminating parental rights if it is in the
child’s best interest and “parent is sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period of time
that would constitute a substantial period of the juvenile’s life”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-
604(1)(b)(3) (2010) (listing “long term confinement of the parent” as a basis for finding a par-
ent unfit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(3) (2010) (terminating parental rights if
parent failed to plan for child’s needs and “respondent is incapable of discharging parental
responsibilities due to extended or repeated incarceration”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1
(West 2011) (listing certain acts that create a rebuttable presumption that a parent is unfit,
including convictions for certain crimes); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.011, 47.10.080,
47.10.086, 47.10.088 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806 (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 16-2005 (2010); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-2 (LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38-2269, 38-2271 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600.020, 610.127 (West 2010);
LA. CHILD CODE ANN. arts. 672.1, 1015 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712A.19b
(LexisNexis 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-423, 41-3-609 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:24-a, 170-C:5 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02, 27-20-44 (2010); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 7006-1.1 (2010); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419B.502 (2009); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 634a, 634b (2010); R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 15-7-7 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 226-8A-26.1, 26-8A-27 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-113 (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 161.002(b), 161.007 (West 2010); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-508 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2010).
224. Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage
of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1019 (2001).
225. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 358-a (Consol. 2011).
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passed bill recognizes the additional difficulties incarcerated parents
face in trying to maintain contact with their children from prison.226
The legislation is a step in the right direction in acknowledging the
barriers incarcerated parents face in attempting to maintain contact
with their children. Efforts to help incarcerated mothers address the
underlying behaviors (such as substance abuse which precipitated the
parent’s imprisonment) and the range of emotional and psychological
issues (such as histories of abuse and mental illness) with which they
are often dealing should continue. Unless legislatures simultaneously
address issues of poverty, unemployment, and inadequate education-
al systems and provide effective childcare networks for these women
whose circumstances may take years to address, these efforts are
likely to have a widespread impact on the rising rates of parental
terminations of incarcerated parents.
Another important area of inquiry would be the disproportion-
ate impact of current laws and policies on women of color and poor
women.227 Professor Twila Perry calls for gathering the stories of
women of color whose parental rights have been terminated.228
Professor Patricia Williams makes the point that redistributing re-
sources so that blacks can afford to raise their own children may be
preferable to placing black children in white homes because they “do
better.” 229 It may be possible to develop a community-based foster-
ing system that allows children whose parents are incarcerated to
stay in their communities, receive adequate parenting, and main-
tain their ties with their parents. In fact, the notion of “community
mothering” has long been a part of African-American traditions and
communities and could be the basis of reconceiving the foster care
system.230 As Professor Patricia Hill Collins has noted, “[i]n many
African-American communities . . . women-centered networks of
community-based child care have extended beyond the boundaries
226. The Adoption and Safe Families Act Expanded Discretion Bill gives agencies more
flexibility to maintain children’s ties to an incarcerated parent, with the hope of reuni-
fication after release. See Policy Agenda 2011: Protecting Bonds Between Mothers and
Children, CORRECTIONAL ASS’N N.Y., http://www.correctionalassociation.org/policy_agenda
/protecting_mothers_and_children.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
227. Professor Roberts proposes an anti-subordination approach that focuses on the
concrete effects of government policy on the substantive conditions of the disadvantaged.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1471, 1477 (1991).
228. Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race,
and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 156, 158–59 (1998).
229. Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, in CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM 151, 153 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
230. Arlene E. Edwards, Community Mothering: The Relationship Between Mothering
and the Community Work of Black Women, 2 J. MOTHERHOOD INITIATIVE FOR RES. &
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 87, 88 (2000).
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of biologically related individuals to include ‘fictive kin.’ ” 231 These
caregivers were neither necessarily related to the children who found
themselves in their care nor did they displace the natural parent.
This “other-mother” tradition, as noted by Professor Collins,232 is
based in the theory that “because all children must be fed, clothed,
and educated, if their biological parents could not discharge these
obligations, then some other member of the community should accept
that responsibility.” 233 Under this view, community mothers could re-
ceive priority as foster care mothers and be paid a premium for caring
for their children in need and keeping them in their own communi-
ties.234 This allows a continuity of care in a familiar community for
the child but can also serve to empower the foster mother and the com-
munity.235 Collins notes that mothering and other-mothering has a
history of leading to community activism.236 Being a mother is often
a source of power and can be a “symbol of hope.” 237 She asserts that
by rejecting separateness and individual interests, community moth-
ering supports connectedness with others and common interests.238
This has the result of fostering a greater sense of community and
can be a source of achieving status in the community.239 On the other
hand, terminating parental rights not only removes children from
their communities but disempowers the mother whose only source
of potential power or status may be as a mother, and disempowers
communities by removing their youth.
A systematic process for educating judges, caseworkers, and
members of the bar about the issues facing incarcerated mothers
might similarly help dull the force of the ASFA and state parental
termination provisions. The need for judges to have a more realistic
view of the nature of the relationship between parent and child, and
the limitations on maintaining contact presented by incarceration,
begs for rethinking the relationship between child welfare and penal
systems. Judicial education could include sessions on the impact of
231. COLLINS, supra note 149, at 179 (citation omitted).
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing MULLINGS, supra note 35).
234. See id. at 180.
235. Id. at 192.
236. Id.
237. COLLINS, supra note 149, at 198; Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 146,
at 132 (“Black women historically have experienced motherhood as an empowering de-
nial of the dominant society’s denigration of their humanity.”).
238. COLLINS, supra note 149, at 192.
239. See Perry, supra note 228, at 117. As part of a discussion of transracial adoption
the author notes that “[f]or Black women, part of the symbolic cultural meaning of
mothering is tied to race.” Id.; see also Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 146,
at 132 (“Bearing and nurturing Black children ensure the life of the Black community.”).
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domestic violence, childhood abuse, mental health issues, and grow-
ing up in poor communities on women and on the abilities of moth-
ers to parent effectively. Women from impoverished communities
may have an even more difficult and stressful role in mothering their
children than mothers with ample financial means and resources.240
Many of these women come from communities which present greater
challenges to mothering and caring for their children than many
other mothers. For example, one study of Central Harlem notes that
“[w]omen [in Harlem] spend an extraordinary amount of time es-
corting children, limiting their movement, and trying . . . to keep
them away from the violence. . . .” 241 Ensuring that judges and case-
workers have a greater understanding of the struggles families face
before, during, and after incarceration might lead to results that
more often than not lead to the preservation of families.
One of the common criticisms of parental incarceration is that
the criminal justice and child welfare systems fail to work together.242
From the point of arrest, through processing the accused and impris-
onment, the criminal justice, sentencing, prison, and child welfare
systems should coordinate their efforts to ensure safe care-taking and
planning for children.243 Most police departments have yet to develop
concrete policies for responding to and dealing with situations in
which children are present at the point of arrest.244 States should
mandate minimum standards for arrest procedures in which children
are involved which would, at a minimum, require the child welfare
agency to be informed of the presence of children and to consult with
the arrested parent immediately after the arrest to ensure the safe
placement of the child with a relative or close friend if at all possi-
ble. In the absence of a family or friend with whom the child could
be placed, the child welfare agency should secure a safe foster care
placement for the children in or near the child’s community and with
an expectation that siblings would not be separated. Moreover, stan-
dards with regard to returning the children to their families as soon
as possible, assistance with maintaining contact between the parent
and child, and minimum levels of communication between the social
worker and parent should be required. The state should impose stan-
dards on child welfare agencies for the facilitation of communication
between parent and child. Balancing the responsibility between the
240. COLLINS, supra note 149, at 197.
241. MULLINGS, supra note 35, at 93.
242. Roberts, supra note 224, at 1019.
243. See Acoca & Raeder, supra note 52, at 136–37; Poehlmann, supra note 22, at 339.
244. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 259.
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parent and the child welfare agency would be more effective in ensur-
ing communication between parent and child and is a more realistic
approach given the significant barriers parents in prison face in com-
municating with their children.
Family courts hearing termination proceedings should adopt a
more holistic integrated approach to resolving termination matters.
Termination proceedings should not proceed without the presence
of the parent whose rights are in issue and those parents should be
guaranteed a right to counsel.245 Perhaps a lesson can be learned from
the integrated approach taken in domestic violence cases in rethink-
ing the interface between family courts and imprisoned parents faced
with parental terminations.246 In some jurisdictions, domestic violence
cases may be assigned to a single judge under the “one family one
judge” philosophy.247 The integrated approach to domestic violence
was adopted in recognition of the myriad social and legal issues fac-
ing families experiencing intimate partner violence.248 Judges are able
to see, understand, and help resolve the criminal, family, and matri-
monial matters.249 These judges bring together the lawyers, social
workers, law guardians, and child welfare personnel who are work-
ing with these families in order to provide a coordinated response to
a problem that affects all members of the family.250
An integrated family court could be authorized to require the ap-
pearance of the parent, child welfare, a law guardian, the family, and
a trained social worker from the penal facility before proceeding with
a termination matter. Judges would have a more realistic view of the
relationship between parent and child, as well as the obstacles to com-
municating faced by incarcerated parents. Adopting an integrated ap-
proach to sentencing and parental terminations, at least in some subset
of cases, would facilitate the coordination of distinct agencies. This ap-
proach involves “taking the whole family to court” in recognition of
245. Kennedy, supra note 26, at 121; see also In re Eileen R., No. 508828, 2010 N.Y. App.
Div. LEXIS 9516, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 23, 2010) (reversing termination of parental
rights in light of the lower court’s failure to consider the incarcerated parents’ request to
testify by telephone).
246. Integrated domestic violence courts are only one example of a generation of special-
ized courts which attempt to deal more holistically with legal issues by addressing not only
the range of legal problems presented in a case but often the social and psychological as
well. Key Principles, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem
_solving/IDV/key_principles.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
247. Overview Family Court, COMMONWEALTH OF KY., http://courts.ky.gov/circuitcourt
/familycourt/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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the fact that when a parent is sentenced, so too is the entire family.251
Mothers who are incarcerated may be faced with trying to find hous-
ing and care for their children, may have drug and alcohol problems,
or may have a host of other social and economic problems that a judge
can weigh in considering sentencing, diversion, and treatment pro-
grams for the incarcerated mother.252
CONCLUSION
Incarcerated mothers remain a vilified group, and their children
and families are largely invisible. Reform is needed so as to stem the
tide of parental terminations due to incarceration and to support
communities that are losing their youth to foster care and inter-
generational crime. Greater assistance is needed for families facing
economic stress and incarceration in order to limit family disruption.
A more realistic view of what mothering entails in the face of poverty,
addiction, and incarceration would better serve mothers and children,
like Caliphah and Omarian.
251. Taking seriously the concern about the impact of incarceration on families and
children would also mean rethinking much of the criminal justice system, including man-
datory minimums, and providing greater latitude in sentencing non-violent offenders.
While addressing these issues goes beyond the scope of this article, one approach could
include permitting sentencing judges to receive “family impact statement[s]” and reports
from child welfare workers about the family. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 261.
252. Id.
